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followed by trade liberalization (whose date is anticipated). Our analysis suggests that a
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rms have a strong cost advantage,
transport costs are negligible, or if the large country opens its market before the small one.
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1 Introduction
This paper analyzes oligopolistic competition between rms located in two countries hav-
ing dierent sizes. It aims at uncovering the eects of trade liberalization on product
choice and prots obtained by the rms, and total welfare of the countries involved.
We assume that rms correctly anticipate the pace of trade liberalization and take it
into account when deciding their product specications at the beginning of the game. For
a certain number of periods each country is in autarky. Then trade liberalization occurs,
and rms compete in the international market for the rest of the time the game is played.
The intertemporal prots of the rms are therefore a function of the speed at which trade
liberalization occurs. The longer the delay with which countries decide to open their
borders, the larger the impact of the autarky conditions and therefore the more relevant
the characteristic of the domestic market. In such a setting, autarky and international
trade are special cases of a more general situation. This is a noteworthy feature of our
model, since most models of trade do not deal with intermediate situations where rms
operate under autarky in some periods and under trade in others. The crucial parameter
here is the speed of trade liberalization. Although we treat this parameter as exogenous
and analyze the eects of changes in it, our framework might be extended to analyze the
case where the speed of trade reform can be an endogenous variable.
To study endogenous product choices, we use a simple version of a well-known par-
tial equilibrium model of vertical product dierentiation where the burden of quality
improvements falls upon xed costs (such as R&D or advertising expenditures). In the
basic version of the game, where countries dier only in market size (i.e., population or
per-capita income), we show that a rm from a large (or rich) country is likely to be
the industry leader after trade liberalization. Indeed, the equilibrium where the market
leader is a rm from a small (or poor) country either does not exist (when asymmetries
are strong), or if it exists it is risk-dominated by the equilibrium where the market leader
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comes from the large (or rich) country.
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In a version of the model with production cost
asymmetries, the small country will become the market leader if it has a strong production
cost advantage.
To understand the overall eect on the rms' prots, notice that the opening of trade
has two eects on the rms. On the one side, there is a competition eect, since rms face
new foreign competitors. On the other side, there is a market expansion eect, since with
trade liberalization rms can sell in an additional market. In general the market leader,
which is more likely to be the rm from the large country, tends to gain more from free
trade. However, rms from the small country might still benet from trade even though
they will not be the market leaders, because they can sell in a larger market than the
domestic one. This happens when the asymmetry in size between the countries is very
pronounced. The opposite might happen to large country's rms, which will lose from
trade even though they are market leaders at the trade equilibrium, when size asymmetries
are large .
We think that our analysis helps understand better the literature on gains from trade
and their distribution between unequal countries. Markusen (1981) shows that trade does
not necessarily increase income in both countries, if they dier in size. In his model rms
(one in each country) produce homogeneous goods and compete a la Cournot when trade
opens. Under constant returns to scale the large country would be an importer of the
good and might lose relative to autarky. The small country is therefore the most likely
to benet from trade liberalization. The situation can change under increasing returns to
scale, since the large country would have a cost advantage which might result in it being
the exporter and the beneciary of trade. With monopolistic competition, Krugman
(1980) shows that workers are better o in the larger country, thanks to the role played
by economies of scale. However, trade has a positive impact on both countries' welfare,
since consumers benet from larger number of product varieties.
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Cabrales, Garca-Fontes and Motta (1997) reports the results of an experiment on a game which is
similar to the game we use in this paper. We nd that the equilibrium where the leader comes from the
large country is selected much more often by the experimental subjects than the alternative equilibrium.
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In our model, similarly to Krugman (1980), welfare is highest in both countries when
trade liberalization occurs immediately. Possible losses by rms are outweighed by con-
sumers' gains, which come under the form of lower prices and higher average qualities.
In a sense, however, we nd again Markusen's concern that trade brings about unequal
gains. Despite the overall increase in welfare for both the large and the small country,
our analysis underlines the possible detrimental impact that trade can have on the prof-
itability of the rms located in one of the countries. This is an issue which has received
less attention in the trade literature, even though we believe it is crucial to understand
under which conditions rms have an incentive to support trade processes.
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A paper by Anderson, Donsimoni and Gabszewicz (1989) addresses this question in the
context of an oligopolistic industry with homogeneous goods. It is found there that at least
in one of the two countries rms make higher prots under autarky than under free trade.
Unlike Anderson, Donsimoni and Gabszewicz (1989) it is not always the large country
rms which lose from trade.
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In our model, xed costs of quality improvements imply
that the expected size of the market faced by the rms along their lifetime determines
the incentive to invest in quality. Unless trade is allowed from the beginning of the game
and transport costs are absent, the rm located in the bigger market has an advantage
(comparable to the cost advantage enjoyed in a model with increasing returns to scale)
which makes it the likely high quality producer when markets open. A rm in the small
country can then be relegated to low quality products and lose from trade.
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Finally, our results are consistent with earlier work which underscores the role played
by domestic demand in determining the success of the rms in the international markets.
In the economic literature, this has been rst noted by Linder (1961) and then formalized
by Krugman (1980) and Dinopoulos (1988). Evidence that size (and sophistication) of the
2
This scarce attention might depend on the popularity among trade economists of monopolistic com-
petition models. Since in these models prots are usually equal to zero, both under autarky and trade
equilibria, the impact of trade on rms' protability cannot be analyzed.
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See also Cordella (1993) and Nguyen and Wigle(1992) for two works where large countries might lose
from trade.
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This is an aspect which was also showed in a dierent context by Motta (1992), where rms from
the small country might have to exit the market because of the competition by higher quality producers.
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home market demand is a possible explanatory factor of competitive advantages is also
reported in the business literature (see for instance Porter (1990)). Indeed, our analysis
suggests that the rms which produce the higher qualities in the international markets are
those which come from the larger countries.
5
A similar result was also found in Motta,
Thisse and Cabrales (1995) where, however, rms did not anticipate the occurrence of
trade and could only adjust their quality choices after an unforeseen trade liberalization
had been announced.
Across all the model specications studied here an immediate move towards free trade
allows both countries to improve their welfare with respect to the autarky situation.
However, our analysis also suggests that trade liberalization reforms might receive strong
opposition from industrial groups, whenever rms' protability is lower under trade than
under autarky.
The paper is presented in the following way. In the next section, we present the
general features of the game. This basic model is then studied within a simple vertical
product dierentiation framework in section 3. Some extensions are considered in section
4. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The basic model
The world economy is composed of two countries. Country A, which we call the large
country, has a share  
1
2
of the total population size S of the world. Country B share
of the world population is 1   . Apart from this size asymmetry, and unless otherwise
specied, these two countries are perfectly identical.
For the sake of simplicity, we make the assumption that at the beginning of the game
only two rms are considering entry into the industry we want to analyze. One rm is
located in country A, and the other in country B. The rms are new in the industry and
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Note that this does not imply that these rms benet from trade liberalization.
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they have to decide the specication of the product they want to supply at the beginning
of their business life. They then incur the cost of their investment in product specication
and cannot change it any longer. Product choice is therefore endogenous and irreversible
6
.
Firms are rational agents who are able to anticipate future events correctly. In partic-
ular, they know that the two countries have negotiated a trade liberalization agreement.
For a number K of years, from time 0 to time K   1, the two markets will continue to
operate under a regime of autarky. Starting from period K, however, the two markets
will be completely integrated and they will remain in a such a situation until the end of
the game,
7
which occurs at time T .
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Firms have a common discount factor, d (we may think that capital markets are open
and therefore interest rates equalize), and the total present value of prots of rm i is:
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where 
M
i
represents the monopoly prot of rm i (i.e. the per-period prot when trade
is not open) and 
D
i
the duopoly prot.
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The variable which denotes the investment in
product specication is x
i
. Note that in monopoly the prots of rm i are independent
of the product chosen by rm j. G is a function which attributes a cost to the investment
made into the variety of the good. We assume that rms share the same technology
G
i
= G
j
and that no other xed costs are necessary to provide a market.
The expression above can be written as:
10
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In section 5.1 we discuss the case where rms are already established when the game starts.
7
Introducing a period of progressive adjustment to complete liberalization of trade would complicate
the analysis without adding any particular element of interest.
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T can be either nite or innite. By assuming the latter, though, we would have a supergame which
gives rise to many possible equilibria. Under nite horizon, we avoid this problem.
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Although the notation of equation (1) does not make it explicit, prots depend also on prices and
quantities. The choice of notation here emphasizes that the prots at the monopoly stage do not depend on
the other country's investment, while in the duopoly stage prots depend on both countries' investments.
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This can be done because in equilibrium during all periods of the duopoly stage the prots are
constant and the prots are also constant in the autarky stage.
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With an appropriate transformation of variables  =
(1 d
K
)
(1 d
T
)
we obtain:

i
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D
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  F; (4)
where F =
(1 d)
(1 d
T
)
G. Note that  tends to zero as K tends to zero. In this case,
trade liberalization is immediate and autarky prots 
M
i
do not play any role in the
rm's present value of prots. Product decisions are taken with reference to a trade
liberalization scenario only. At the other extreme, when  is equal to one, K tends to T .
Firms are in a situation of domestic monopoly throughout their life.
The reader may be worried about the assumption that the rms anticipate perfectly
and correctly the timing of the trade liberalization process. This is a rather strong as-
sumption for which we can oer two justications. The rst one is that one may interpret
the parameters (1   ) and  in the equation above as the subjective probabilities the
rms attach to the events that international trade and autarky respectively will be the
prevailing ones for the lifetime of the product. Clearly, we would then have to assume
that rms have the same information about the likelihood of these events and therefore
the probability assigned by each rm to the events is independent of the rms.
Another justication is that the assumption about perfect knowledge of the timing of
liberalization can be seen as a polar case. The other benchmark case is the one where
rms are surprised by trade liberalization and do not take it into account at the moment
when decisions on product choices are made. This case has already been analyzed in
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Motta, Thisse and Cabrales(1995) and will be briey recalled in section 5.1 below.
To have a full characterization of how the speed of liberalization aects the product
choices of the rms, we turn now to the specication of the model.
3 Endogenous quality choices: the model.
We use a vertical product dierentiation model
11
to analyze more in depth the game whose
general features we have briey outlined above. In this section we assume that there exist
no transport costs and that technology, costs and incomes (or tastes) are identical in
the two countries. (We relax each of these assumptions in the next section.) Countries
dier only by population sizes. We show that this game might have two equilibria in
pure strategies. In the rst equilibrium, it is the rm located in the bigger country which
produces the top quality and is the leader
12
. In the second, it is the rm located in the
small country. The former equilibrium always exists, the latter exists provided that the
small country does not delay trade liberalization too long. Nevertheless, the equilibrium
(if it exists) where the market leader comes from the small country is never selected if the
concept of risk dominance (Harsanyi and Selten (1988)) is used.
First, we present the model. Then, we analyze the equilibrium where the market
leader comes from the big country. Finally, we turn to the equilibrium where the leader
comes from the small country, and we identify the conditions under which it exists. The
criterion of risk dominance is then used to select between these two equilibria.
In the two countries consumers have utility function U = u  p if they buy one unit
11
See Mussa and Rosen (1978), Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979), Shaked and Sutton (1982), and Motta
(1993).
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In vertical dierentiation models with xed costs of quality, the rm with higher quality has the
higher share of the market and enjoys larger prots: this justies referring to it as the market leader,
as we shall do in the remainder. In models where quality costs fall upon variable costs, rms with
dierent qualities earn similar prots. That model would give similar results to one where products were
horizontally dierentiated. In a model with variable costs of quality it would be less important to study
which rm is going to be the market leader, since rms with dierent quality levels would earn similar
prots. See the working paper version of this work for an analysis of trade within such a model.
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of the dierentiated good and U = 0 if they do not buy. The symbols u and p denote
quality and price of the good, while  represents a taste parameter. The distribution of 
in the two countries is the same. We assume it is uniform and that  2 [0;

]. The mass
of consumers is given by

S
i
in each country i (i = A;B), with S
A
 S
B
. This amounts
to saying that country A has a higher population size than country B.
Firms decide on the quality they want to produce at the initial period t = 0. To
do so, they incur a xed cost F
i
= ku
2
i
=2. This function is widely used in this type of
models.
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We then assume that rms play in each period t the Bertrand game, for a
(T + 1) number of times.
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We can now specify the expressions of the prots 
M
i
and

D
i
appearing in equation (4), just by solving the last stage of the game. In the case
of monopoly, a rm faces demand q
i
= S
i

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=u
i
. It is then straightforward that the
optimal price choice for the monopolist is p
i
= u
i

=2. Correspondingly, the monopolist
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t is 
M
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= u
i
S
i
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2
=4: Note that the higher the population size the higher the marginal
protability of the monopolist, which would then have a larger incentive to invest in
quality. In the case of duopoly, that is when rms compete in the international market,
demand faced by the top and bottom quality rm respectively would be:
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: At the price equilibrium, prots for the top and bottom quality are:
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:
One can check that the prices chosen at the last stage of the game by the rms are
completely independent of the hypothesis of integrated vs. segmentedmarkets.
15
Indeed,
prices charged in a market depend on the parameter

 which is the same in both countries,
13
See for instance Motta (1993). One may interpret the parameter k as incorporating the scalar term
(1 d)
1 d
T
in equation (3).
14
In the working paper version we show that the qualitative results are unaected by the assumption
of quantity instead of price competition.
15
Markets are integrated when there can be no price discrimination between them. Markets are seg-
mented when there can be price discrimination.
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while they do not depend on the market size parameter. Hence, rms would choose the
same price even if they could price discriminate. Contrary to other models where the
assumption of integrated rather than segmented market can change the results (see eg.
Markusen and Venables (1988)), our model is not sensitive to this assumption.
We are now able to write the intertemporal prot functions of the rms:
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i; j = A;B; i 6= j
Recall that in the equation above S
A
= S and that S
B
= (1   )S. Next, it should
be noted that we have deliberately not specied whether the high quality rm is located
in country A or in country B, and vice versa for the low quality rm. Indeed, there might
exist two equilibria in pure strategies. In the rst one, it is the rm located in the bigger
country which produces the top quality. In the second, the market leader is instead the
rm located in the small country.
3.1 The market leader is located in the big country
When we analyze the case where the top quality rm comes from the big country A, the
rst-order conditions of the problem are:
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By dividing the two equations above, rearranging and writing u
1
= ru
2
with r > 1 we
obtain:
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4(4r  1)
3
= 0 (9)
We have found the analytical solutions of this equation by using the program Mathemat-
ica. There is only one real root r

= r(; ) which satises the constraint r > 1. By
substituting r

into expression (8) and using u
1
= ru
2
we nd the two qualities (u

1
; u

2
).
Note that the parameters S;


2
;
1
k
enter the expressions in a multiplicative way and there-
fore do not aect the solutions.
The solutions have been obtained under the hypothesis that country A rm produces
the top quality, and country B rm the bottom quality. To make sure that the pair
(u

1
; u

2
) we have found is really an equilibrium, we also have to check that country B rm
does not nd it protable to 'leapfrog' the rival and provide a quality higher than u

1
.
In other words, it must be checked that there exists no quality u
0
1
such that 
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2
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). Likewise, it must be checked that the rm from country A does not
have an incentive to deviate by supplying a quality which is lower than u

2
. Indeed, it is
possible to prove that these deviations are not protable, and therefore conclude that the
pair (u

1
; u

2
) is always an equilibrium.
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By replacing the equilibrium qualities one can obtain the expressions for equilibrium
prots, consumer surplus, domestic welfare and aggregate welfare.
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In particular, the
expressions for consumer surplus can be obtained by substituting the equilibrium qualities
into the following:
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Details are available from the authors upon request.
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See below for their graphical representation. We omit the analytical solutions because they are
extremely long and little can be gained from their inspection.
10
CS
B
= (1  )S


2
16u
3
1
  16u
3
1
+ 20u
2
1
u
2
  4u
2
1
u
2
  8u
1
u
2
2
+ u
3
2
8(4u
1
  u
2
)
2
(11)
Note that consumer surpluses dier across countries for two reasons. Firstly, because
countries have dierent population sizes (we are computing the aggregate, and not the
per-capita surplus). Secondly, because in autarky country A citizens consume the top
quality whereas country B citizens have to content themselves with the lower quality. For
 = :5 and  = 0, the two expressions collapse to the same.
Finally, by using W
A
= 
1
+ CS
A
, W
B
= 
2
+ CS
B
, and W = W
A
+ W
B
, country
and total welfares can be found. Again, total population size, maximum taste and cost
parameters play only a multiplicative role in the equilibrium solutions. Therefore, from
now on we normalize these values to S = 1,

 = 10, and k = 1. This is without loss of
generality, as the same property holds for the equilibrium with the rm from the small
country being the leader.
Figure 1 shows equilibrium qualities, prots and welfares as functions of the delay
in trade liberalization, represented by the parameter , which ranges from 0 (free trade
from the rst period) to 1 (autarky forever). Each curve is drawn for a given value of
the parameter , which denotes the relative size of the large market. If a change of
 is represented by a movement along a given curve, a change in  shifts the curve.
The top panels illustrate the evolution of equilibrium qualities. As for u
1
, the results are
unambiguous. For any given relative market size, an increase in the speed of liberalization
increases the value of the top quality. Indeed, a lower value of  has two eects which have
the same sign. Firstly, trade increases the size of the market (market size eect) and thus
the marginal protability of quality investment. Secondly, it also increases the period in
which the rm is exposed to competition (competition eect). In turn, this pushes the
rm to increase its product quality to dierentiate it from the other rm. Both eects
raise the incentives to provide a higher quality. For a given trade liberalization prole, an
increase in the relative size of country A (a rise in parameter ) increases the marginal
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protability of quality, and thus the incentive to invest in quality improvement.
The behavior of the bottom quality, apparently less clear cut, can be understood by
taking into account that (for given size of the market) the need to dierentiate in order
to relax price competition pushes the low quality rm to decrease its quality level. The
competition eect takes in this case an opposite sign as the market size eect. The opening
of trade tends to decrease the quality produced by the former rm. When country B is
not too small (eg. when  = :5 or  = :7), the market size eect - which in principle would
tend to increase qualities by both rms - is less important. Hence, liberalization decreases
the quality level of the rm located in the small country. However, when country B is
very small (eg. when it is only a tenth of the total population size,  = :9), the positive
eect due to the expansion of the market which follows trade liberalization is stronger
than the competition eect, thus increasing u
2
as  decreases.
The interpretation of the equilibrium prot schedules for a given size but dierent
speed in liberalization goes along the same lines. The top quality rm is the one which
reaps the benet from liberalization to a greater extent. However, when country A is very
large, the expansion of the market given by trade tends to play a smaller role than the
eect of competition. (In the limit, when the size of the small country tends to zero, the
rm would have to compete with a rival on a market of the same size as in autarky.) For
any given speed of liberalization, an increase in the value of  increases market demand
and therefore the protability of country A rm, whose prot function shifts upwards.
Obviously, prot shifts downwards for the bottom quality rm, since an increase in 
implies a decrease in domestic demand.
Consumers from both countries benet from an increase in the speed of liberalization
(which corresponds to a lower value of ) through an increased competition which tends
to increase the availability of varieties, to reduce prices for given qualities and to increase
the level of the top quality on the market. The positive eect on consumer utility tends
to outweigh the possible negative eect on rm prots. Immediate trade liberalization
brings about a higher welfare level than under autarky, and for both countries. However,
12
partial trade liberalization (that is, trade liberalization after many periods of autarky)
might worsen a country's welfare with respect to the situation arising in a completely
closed economy. This occurs when two countries are very similar and trade is open for
few periods only. In this case the rm which is going to produce the lower quality at
equilibrium has lower prots than under monopoly, and trade is not open long enough
for consumers' gains to oset the rm's losses (in Figure 1, the welfare schedule W
B
for
 = :5 takes a U-shape). One important thing to note is that even though total welfare is
maximized by liberalizing trade at the earliest possible date, there is always at least one
rm that loses by liberalizing trade early, so we should expect in this context that some
rm would oppose liberalization, if no compensating mechanism is implemented.
3.2 The market leader is located in the small country
In the case where the top quality rm is located in country B, the rst-order conditions
of the problem become:
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We can then write u
1
= zu
2
(with z  1) and use the same procedure followed
to derive the equilibrium solutions in the previous section. We then nd the value z

=
z(; ) which satises the rst-order conditions, and by substitution the candidate solution
(u

1
; u

2
). However, it turns out that this is not an equilibrium for all the values of the
parameters. Indeed, the rm located in the large country might nd it protable to
produce a quality u
0
1
higher than the quality u

1
the rival would produce at the candidate
solution. In other words, 
0
1
(u
0
1
; u
2
= u

1
) can be higher than 

2
(u

1
; u

2
). We have
studied the optimal deviation u
0
1
that country A rm can make, and compared 
0
1
with


2
. Unless the two countries have exactly the same size, it is always possible to nd
13
a value of the parameter  large enough for the candidate equilibrium to break down.
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Indeed, the smaller the size of country B and the more dicult will be for its rm to be the
market leader (the lower the value of  which is necessary to sustain this equilibrium). In
the case where  = 0 each rm is selling on the single market from the very beginning, and
thus the reduced size of the domestic market does not limit the scope for the investment.
However, as the delay in implementing the trade integration process increases (as  rises),
each rm produces for longer periods for the domestic market. If the size of the latter is
small, the domestic rm cannot support the burden of a very high cost in quality, even
if it anticipates that it can be the leader once trade is liberalized. In turn, this makes
it easier for the rm located in the large country to `leapfrog' the rival and produce a
quality which is higher.
If the argument is still not clear, consider the following extreme example. Let country
B be innitesimally small ( ! 1), so that its rm produces under monopoly a quality
u
M
B
= . If rms expect trade liberalization to occur only in a very remote period of
their business lifes (alternatively, their common discount factor is extremely low), that is
 ! 1, the quality that country B rm might wish to produce cannot be much higher
than , whereas the quality chosen by country A rm would be close to
S


2
4
. Obviously,
an equilibrium with the rm coming from the small country being the leader cannot
be sustained. At the other extreme, when trade is expected to be free at the outset
( ! 0), the weight of the domestic market is irrelevant, and rms will have the same
opportunity to be the market leader. Figure 2 shows the equilibrium outcomes in the
plane (; ): Note that the equilibrium where the leader comes from the large country
(denoted by E1) always exists, whereas the equilibrium where the leader comes from the
small country (denoted by E2) exists only if trade is liberalized soon enough or if the two
countries are not too diering in sizes, for the reasons we have given above.
For the values of the parameters such that the equilibrium E2 exists, one can then
use the values of quality, u
1
and u
2
, which solve equations (12) and (13) to derive all the
18
See the working paper version of this paper for more details.
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other equilibrium values.
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Figure 3 illustrates the equilibrium solutions (the dotted line
indicates parameter values for which the equilibriumwith the small country rm being the
leader does not exist). As in the previous case, the results can be understood by thinking
in terms of the competition and the market size eects. A complete discussion is probably
superuous. It may be worth emphasizing that when the rm from the large country is
to be the bottom quality rm, then its prots are certainly going to shrink as the speed
of liberalization increases. Since it comes from the large country and it produces the low
quality at the open markets equilibrium, the competition eect is always dominant (the
additional market when trade opens is relatively unimportant with respect to the eect
played by the opening of competition). The opposite is true for the small country rm,
which benets both from the expansion of the market and from being the leader.
Even in this case, welfare attains its maximum level in both countries when trade lib-
eralization occurs from the outset ( = 0). However, similarly to the previous equilibrium
case, there might be a welfare loss in the case of partial liberalization. In particular, this
occurs for a large country whose rm is relegated to the production of a low quality (see
the schedule W
A
when  = :5), and when trade is liberalized only at a late period ( is
close to 1). Here again, consumers do not enjoy free trade of goods for a long enough
period to outweigh the rm's losses with respect to autarky.
By comparing the values under the two dierent equilibrium congurations (Figures
1 and 3), it can be checked that the domestic welfare in each country is higher when
the national rm is the market leader, which suggests that a government would have an
incentive to commit to help the domestic rm to gain such a position. Further, it can be
noticed that total welfare is higher when the market leader is located in the large country.
This is quite intuitive a result, since it is more ecient to have an equilibrium where the
top quality rm spreads its investment costs over a larger domestic market.
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Recall that some changes are needed. For instance, W
A
= 
2
+ CS
A
and W
B
= 
1
+ CS
B
in the
case the leader is country B rm.
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3.3 Risk Dominance
It has been shown in Figure 2 that the game has two strict Nash equilibria, for a region of
the parameters  and . Standard renements like perfectness, properness, or strategic
stability do not select among strict Nash equilibria. Also, in this game there are no
symmetric equilibria and no equilibriumPareto dominates the other (taking in to account
only the welfare of the players, the rms; and not the consumers). There is a solution
concept that selects between equilibria in our game, though. This is the criterion of risk-
dominance introduced by Harsanyi and Selten (1988). Since the concept of risk dominance
is dened only for games with nitely many pure strategies we have to discretize the
strategy space. We will show the results obtained when the discretization is very coarse,
keeping only the equilibrium strategies for the two players. The advantage of discretizing
this way is that the intuition for the concept of risk dominance is stronger for the two
strategy case, and its relevance is better supported theoretically and empirically (research
for the case with many strategies is not as well established). It is also much simpler and
faster to compute the risk dominant equilibrium in the two strategy case. The restriction
does not condition the results, anyway. We have done numerical analysis (available upon
request), using the "tracing procedure" of Harsanyi and Selten (1988), that shows that
the risk dominant equilibrium is the same even for a much ner discretization.
Risk dominance selects equilibria by comparing the \riskiness" of equilibrium points.
This criterion compares the product of equilibriummisforecasts and the equilibrium with
the largest product is the one that risk dominates. Let a 2  2 game with the following
payo matrix.
B
1
B
2
A
1
a
11
; b
11
a
12
; b
12
A
2
a
21
; b
21
a
22
; b
22
where the payos are such that E
1
= (A
1
; B
1
) and E
2
= (A
2
; B
2
) are strict Nash equilib-
ria, and let LA
1
= a
11
  a
21
. LA
1
is the gain made by player A by predicting rightly that
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the other player will play E
1
(and best responding to the prediction) instead of predict-
ing wrongly that the other player will play E
2
(and best responding to the prediction).
Similarly, let LB
1
= b
11
  b
12
.LA
2
= a
22
  a
12
.LB
2
= b
22
  b
21
. We say that equilibrium
E
1
risk dominates equilibrium E
2
when LA
1
LB
1
> LA
2
LB
2
.
Besides the intuition and the axiomatization provided by Harsanyi and Selten , there
are more reasons why risk dominance could be considered a good equilibrium selection
criterion (see Kandori, Mailath and Rob(1993) and Carlsson and Van Damme(1993)).
Perhaps the most appealing argument for risk dominance is that in the experiments
perfomed by Cabrales, Garca-Fontes and Motta (1997), Guyer and Rapoport (1972) and
Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil(1990) the risk dominant equilibrium is the one selected by
actual players.
Let E
1
be the equilibrium where the big country rm is the leader and E
2
be the
equilibrium where the small country rm is the leader. Recall that A is the big country
and B is the small country.
In our case a
11
= 
1A
(u

1
; u

2
), a
21
= 
1A
(u

1
; u

2
), a
12
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1A
(u

1
; u

2
), a
22
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2A
(u
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2
; u
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1
),
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2
), b
21
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2B
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1
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) and b
22
= 
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(u
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2
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).
In our case, LA
1
is what player A gains by forecasting rightly that the other player
will play the equilibrium where A itself is the leader, instead of forecasting wrongly that
the other equilibrium holds. LA
2
represents the gains for player A of forecasting rightly
that the other player will play the equilibrium where B is the leader. The interpretation
of LB
1
and LB
2
is analogous.
Figure 4 shows that we have LA
1
LB
1
 LA
2
LB
2
, and the equality only holds when
 = 0, that is, when liberalization occurs at the earliest possible date. Thus, for the game
we are studying the risk dominance criterion selects the equilibrium where the leader is
the large country rm, except in the limiting case where the two countries liberalize the
markets immediately (when  = 0).
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Equilibrium selection can be interpreted in strong way and in a weaker way. The strong
interpretation is that we will never (or rarely) observe players choosing the strategies
that lead to an equilibrium that is not selected. The weaker interpretation is that the
likelihood of observing players using the strategies that lead to each equilibrium is related
to the dierence LA
1
LB
1
  LA
2
LB
2
. The larger this dierence, the likelier it is that
we will observe players using the E
1
strategies. We feel that the weaker hypothesis is
more reasonable, not only because it is more dicult to reject, but also because most
of the reasons in favor of risk dominance involve uncertainty or bounded rationality (see
Harsanyi and Selten (1988) p.89), and in these circumstances it would be hard to expect
the strong hypothesis to be satised. In our game, this interpretation would amount to
saying that the more asymmetric the two country sizes, the less likely to observe the E
2
equilibrium, namely the equilibrium with the leader coming from the small country.
3.4 Conclusions
In this section we have analyzed how market size and the speed of trade liberalization
aect the equilibrium outcome of a game where rms take product quality decisions by
correctly anticipating the occurrence of trade. The analysis suggests that the rm coming
from the large country would be the likely market leader. Indeed, when country sizes
dier substantially, it would be impossible for the small country rm to be the leader.
Further, we have seen that the equilibrium with the large country rm being the leader is
always selected by the risk dominance criterion. Although the risk dominance concept as
an equilibrium selection criterion is open to discussion (especially because the selection
power of this criterion is probably higher when asymmetries are not too weak), this result
does support the idea that the leader under trade would tend to be the large country rm.
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4 Transport costs, and other extensions
In this section, we relax some of the assumptions we have made so far. Armed with
the analysis carried out for the benchmark model, it will be easy to deal with some
extensions. First, we analyze the case of positive transport costs. Second, we study
what happens when countries dier in their citizens' propensity to pay (that is, in their
tastes) for quality, instead of population sizes. Third, we relax the assumption that rms
have identical production costs and identical technologies for the improvement of product
qualities.
4.1 Transport costs
We have so far assumed zero exporting costs. This is clearly a useful assumption, albeit
a strong one when dealing with international trade. We now introduce positive transport
costs, modeled as \iceberg costs". This formalization implies a proportional reduction
of the quantity that can be sold abroad with respect to the quantity produced. For
example, if a rm ships to the foreign market a number q of units of the good, only q=g
(with g  1) units arrive at destination in the foreign market. This amounts to saying that
foreign sales give the exporting rm a unit revenue of p=g which is lower than the price p
paid by foreign consumers. Monopoly prots for the rms are obviously unchanged, while
duopoly prots for the top and the bottom quality rms with positive transport costs are
(for i; j = A;B; i 6= j; g  1):
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We can now solve the price stage of the game and write the intertemporal prot
20
Note that even when transport costs are positive equilibrium prices do not depend on the assumption
of segmented v. integrated markets. This is because transport costs aect only market sizes, which in
turn do not aect rst-order conditions at the price stage of the game.
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i; j = A;B; i 6= j; g  1
By comparing the expressions above with expressions (5) and (6), one can see that
transport costs reduce the relative protability of the small country rm. Duopoly prots
are now multiplied by (S
A
+
S
B
g
) for the rm located in the large country A, and by
(S
B
+
S
A
g
) for country B rm, while both were multiplied by (S
A
+ S
B
) in expressions
(5) and (6) with no transport costs. Given that S
A
 S
B
and g  1, it follows that
(S
A
+
S
B
g
)  (S
B
+
S
A
g
). Ceteris paribus, transport costs give an advantage to the large
country rm, which enjoy a larger captive market. By reducing protability of the small
country rm, this limits its incentive to invest in quality. Hence, it will be more dicult
for this rm to be the leader at equilibrium. Figure 5 shows this eect: When transport
costs rise (g = 2 in the gure) the area where the small country rm can be the leader at
equilibrium (E2) is reduced with respect to the case of no transport costs (g = 1).
Note also that while in the benchmark case (zero transport costs) the equilibriumwith
the rm from the small country being the leader always existed if trade liberalisation
was immediate ( = 0), this is no longer true in the case of transport costs. Actually,
liberalising trade at the rst period is not enough to guarantee that the two rms are
playing on a level ground: the large country rm enjoys the advantage of a larger domestic
market even if trade occurred from the rst period. For large enough transport costs and
large enough country dierences the equilibrium E2 does not exist even if trade occurs at
the very beginning of the game.
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4.2 Dierent preferences for quality, or incomes
We have analyzed so far the case where consumers in two countries have identical average
propensity to pay (or taste) for quality (


A
=


B
=

), with countries diering only
in their population size. Since in vertical product dierentiation models a relationship
can be established between taste for quality and income (see Tirole(1988,p.86)), we may
interpret the case treated so far as one where countries have similar per-capita income but
dierent population size. If trade occurs between countries of similar population size but
dierent per-capita incomes (or dierent propensities to pay for quality), that is


A



B
and S
A
= S
B
, it is straightforward to see from the prot expressions that we would have
similar results to those obtained above. Market A still gives rise to larger demand for
the good under monopoly and this gives its rm a better position in the international
market. Two equilibria still arise but the one where the leader comes from the small
country ceases to exist when the dierence between the two countries is above a certain
threshold (that is, when


A
is much larger than


B
) and is always risk-dominated by the
other equilibrium. This explains why in the paper we refer to country A indierently as
the rich or the large country.
When S
A
 S
B
but


A



B
two forces of opposite sign are at work. The former
enlarges the relative size of market A, whereas the latter reduces it. In particular, country
A will have the larger domestic market if S
A


2
A
 S
B


2
B
. If this condition holds, we can
still speak of country A's rm as the one located in the large country, and all the results
and discussions above would still hold.
4.3 Asymmetries in Costs
We analyze rst the case of asymmetry in the unit costs of production, and then the case
of asymmetry in the costs of developing the quality of the goods.
Let us start with the case of asymmetry in production costs. If the large country has
also a production cost advantage (for instance, because of cheaper labor), this strengthens
21
the eect of the larger domestic market for country A's rm. Since both asymmetries
increase its protability and incentive to invest in quality, its chances to be the market
leader at equilibrium are higher. The case where the small country rm has a production
cost advantage is less trivial. The market scale eect helps the large country rm, whereas
the production cost eect favors the small country rm. It is the relative magnitude of
these two eects which determine the equilibrium solutions of the game. As we show
below, if the cost advantage is high enough, there is a unique equilibriumwhere the small
country rm is the leader.
We will now assume that the production of a given good requires some units of that
same good, with the same level of quality u
i
, as an input in the production process
(think of farmers using seeds or computer manufacturers using computers). This is the
only additional cost we introduce to the costs assumed in previous sections. The more
inecient is the rm (the higher its production costs), the fewer the units of the good
which are obtained as a nal output from any given number of initial units of the good.
Let us write gross prots of rm i as 
i
= p
i
e
i
q
i
, where e
i
is the eciency parameter
in the production process, or an inverse measure of production costs (with 1  e
i
 0)
and where p
i
and q
i
are as usual the price and output of rm i. The parameter e
i
acts
simply as a rescaling factor on both duopoly and monopoly prots and we can write the
intertemporal prot functions of the rms in the presence of production costs as:
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i; j = A;B; i 6= j
Without loss of generality we x e
B
= 1  e
A
. The eect of higher unit costs in
22
country A is to increase the range of parameter values for which the equilibrium with
the small country rm being the leader exists and to decrease the range for which the
equilibrium with the large country rm is the leader exists. We can have three possible
situations. If size asymmetries are large and cost asymmetries are small, we nd only
the equilibrium of type E
1
(leader in the large country); for low enough size and cost
asymmetries both equilibria exist; nally, for low enough size asymmetries and large
enough cost asymmetries, only the type E
2
equilibrium (leader in the small country)
exist.
21
Figure 6 represents this eect in the same space (; ) as the previous graphs. The
lower eciency of country A (e
A
= :7) implies that the area where only the equilibrium
with the large country rm being the leader (E1) exists shrinks relative to the case of
identical production costs. There also exists a region where this equilibrium disappears
altogether.
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As for the costs of developing the quality of their goods, we have so far assumed
that rms have identical abilities in research and development or advertising activities.
This amounts to assuming that the parameter k in the quality improvement function is
identical for both rms (k
A
= k
B
= k). If dierences in R&D or advertising technologies
were in favor of country A, these would reinforce the country size advantage, and the
results would just be strengthened. The interesting case is therefore the one where the
rm from the small country B is more ecient in introducing innovations and improving
quality, so that k
A
 k
B
. To simplify the analysis and focus on quality cost asymmetries,
we assume that unit production costs are the same in both countries. It turns out that this
case is very similar to the one just discussed where rms have identical quality costs but
21
We have not applied the risk dominance criterion to try and select one of the two equilibria in the
region where both exist. This is because in the presence of one additional (cost) parameter the problem
becomes even more cumbersome.
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This occurs when  is close to 1 and countries are not so dierent ( close to :5). To understand why
this happens, consider the extreme case where  = 1    and  = :5. In this case, trade opens only at
the very last period of the game and equilibrium qualities under liberalization cannot dier much from
autarky ones. But since under autarky we have u
A
= (e
A
=4)(S=2)


2
< u
B
= (1=4)(S=2)


2
, the former
cannot be the top quality at the trade equilibrium. By a continuity argument, one can then explain why
in a region where  is close to 1 and  is close to :5 the E1 equilibrium does not exist.
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dierent production costs. The reason is that the parameter k
i
enters multiplicatively the
cost expression in the intertemporal prot function, while e
i
enters multiplicatively the
gross prot term in the same function (recall that 
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= e
i

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i
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
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)).
As a result, a higher k
i
aects equilibrium solutions in qualitatively the same way as a
lower e
i
, all other things being equal. Hence, the discussion made for the case of dierent
unit costs still holds for the case of dierent quality costs. If the rm coming from the
small country has an advantage in quality development costs, this might outweigh its
market size disadvantage. The stronger its cost advantage, the earlier trade liberalization
and the less unequal country sizes, and the more likely that country B's rm will be the
leader at the equilibrium (and in turn the less likely that there exists the equilibriumwith
country A's rm being the leader).
5 Discussion, and conclusions
In this section we rst discuss the role played by some of the assumptions we have used.
Then, we make some concluding comments.
5.1 Trade liberalisation with adjustments of quality
Throughout the paper we have assumed that at the moment the game starts rms have
never invested nor produced. How does our analysis change if prior to the game the rms
have already selected a product quality? Consider the following scenario. At period t = 0
each rm j is producing a quality level u
j
, with j = A;B. This initial quality level is
exogenously given and may depend on various historical accidents, past levels of R&D
activities, advertising expenditures and so on. The game is then played as described before
(K periods of autarky and T  K of trade) with the dierence that rms can update their
quality levels at a time t by incurring some adjustment costs. To have a specication as
close as possible to the one adopted above, assume a quadratic cost function of quality
improvement: (u
j
  u
j
)
2
=2. The model can then be analyzed in the same fashion as we
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have done in the previous sections.
Motta, Thisse and Cabrales (1995) studied the case where initial qualities coincide
with the quality a rm would adopt if it were operating in autarky and did not know
trade would open at some date in the future (rms can update qualities when unexpected
trade integration occurs). As in the present paper, they nd that two equilibria might
arise, that the equilibriumwith the leader being in the small country exists only if country
asymmetries are not large, and it is always risk dominated. The similarity with the results
obtained here is reassuring and suggests that more sophisticated models which combine
the features of the two settings would not give very dierent results.
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5.2 Number of rms, free entry, and welfare
The assumption that there are only two rms in the industry simplies our analysis
considerably. It could be rationalized if there exist important set-up costs which prevent
a larger number of rms from operating in the industry. Allowing for a larger number of
rms would increase the indeterminacy of the equilibrium outcomes. For instance, if two
rms come from country A and one from country B, then we would have equilibria where
country B rm might produce the top, medium or bottom quality. The analysis of the
existence of the equilibria and the application of the risk dominance criterion would be
considerably more complex, but it is unlikely that this would add much to the analysis.
We have also assumed in our basic duopoly case that there exists a rm in each
country. This assumption might not be innocuous and the welfare conclusions obtained
in the standard case above might be aected. In particular, the trade impact on the
welfare of the large country might be negative if most or all the rms operating under
free trade were located in the small country. As an illustration, consider the case where
23
An example of such richer models could be one where rms play a "rst-autarky-then-trade" game
but could decide on two distinct qualities for each conguration: a quality for the domestic market and
another quality for the international market, when it opens. If the latter can be developed improving
upon the initial quality (by paying an adjustment cost), then this model would combine the two settings
just discussed in a unique but more complex framework.
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there exist no transportation costs and where at most two rms can operate at the free
trade equilibrium, whereas only one rm can operate under autarky. If  = 1, that
is under autarky, it is easy to check that the welfare of the large country is given by

2
S
2

4
=16. If  = 0, that is if both countries open immediately to free trade, there exists
the possibility that both rms operating at the trade equilibrium come from the small
country. If this is the case, then the large country would lose all its prots, and its welfare
would coincide with the consumer surplus of its citizens, which is given by :0432S
2

4
.
One can then check that trade leads to a welfare loss in the large country if  > :69. In
other words, if a country is much larger than the other and none of the rms operate in
it under (immediate) free trade, then the loss of autarky prot outweighs the consumer's
gains.
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This example looks truly like a knife-edge case. It would be enough to assume
that transportation costs are dierent from zero, for instance, to give an advantage to the
rms located in the large country, and reestablish a relationship between the size of the
market and the nationality of the rms operating at the trade equilibrium. Nevertheless,
it is possible that the study of models with many rms yields further surprises. We leave
this subject for future research.
Although our analysis suggests a welfare improving role for free trade, the reader
should be aware that gains from trade do not necessarily arise in any vertical product
dierentiation models. In the papers by Shaked and Sutton (1984) and Motta (1992) a
country's welfare might decrease following a trade liberalization process. This dierent
outcome deserves an explanation. In those models, the possible adverse eect of trade
mainly depends on the fact that the so-called \niteness property" holds there. As market
size increases, a larger number of rms cannot coexist in the industry. Hence, when trade
opens (that is, as the size of the market rises), some of the rms formerly operating in
autarky have to exit the industry. Since some rms disappear at the trade equilibrium, free
trade can have a dramatic impact as the loss in rms' revenues can outweigh consumers
gains. In our model instead, the niteness property does not hold and trade liberalization
24
See Motta (1992) for a similar result.
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has a less dramatic impact on rms prots, and hence on countries' welfare.
5.3 Dierent dates of market opening
Although optimistic as for the welfare eects on each country as a whole, our model
also illustrates the danger that trade liberalisation might represent for a rm coming
from poorer, smaller or less technologically advanced countries. The analysis shows that
such a rm is likely to be relegated to production of a lower quality at equilibrium: the
equilibrium where it is the leader might not exist if asymmetries are large enough; or, if
it existed, it would be risk-dominated. It is still possible that such a rm might gain from
trade liberalisation, in some circumstances. For instance, this happens when a country
is much smaller than the other, rms are otherwise symmetric, and transport costs are
not important. Overall, though, our analysis tends to underline the risks that a rm
coming from a poorer or a smaller country (other things being equal) might run. It would
therefore be natural to wonder what instruments might compensate existing asymmetries.
A possible answer might reside in dierent opening periods for the dierent markets. For
instance, consider what happens if market A is open to imports from country B at a
period K
A
, while (the smaller) market B was open to trade at a later period K
B
> K
A
.
Following a similar procedure as the one used in section 2, we can then derive the two
rms' prots as:

A
= 
A

M
A
+ (1   
A
)
D
A
  F; (18)

B
= 
A

M
B
+ (
B
  
A
)
M
B
+ (1  
A
)
D
B
  F; (19)
where 
A
and 
B
are a measure of the delay with which trade is liberalised in each country.
It is straightforward to see that the longer 
B
with respect to 
A
the stronger the
possibility for the small country rm to become the leader, since its marginal protability
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of an investment in quality rises. Even though a full policy analysis is beyond our inten-
tions, it should be noted that a delayed opening date for the small country might not be
recommendable in general. First, we know that rms located in very small country gain
from trade even if they are relegated to production of lower quality goods (see Figure 1)
because of the importance of the market expansion eect. Therefore, there would be no
reason to grant them a longer period of protection on their domestic market. Second,
by looking at the impact of trade liberalization from a broader perspective than the one
allowed by our formalization, we should consider the possibility of adverse eects of longer
protection of a country's rms. For instance, today's protection might lead to tomorrow's
demands for further delay in liberalization of the market. Third, it is not clear why the
large country government, or its rms, should accept dierent opening dates for the two
economies. This calls for the study of a bargaining game played by the two countries
over the dates of liberalization of each economy. But this sort of issues would be better
analyzed by a fully edged political economy model than in the simple model we have
proposed here.
5.4 Conclusions
Our model underlines that domestic market size plays an important role in determining
the success of rms in the international markets. Indeed, both the analysis of the existence
of equilibrium outcomes and the use of risk dominance as the criterion for equilibrium
selection suggest that a rm coming from a large (or rich) country is the likelier market
leader under free trade, unless it suers from strong cost disadvantages (and transport
costs are negligible).
Our analysis indicates that even if a country as a whole gains from trade, there is
always a rm which loses from trade. This rm can be located either in the large or
in the small country, depending mainly on the magnitude of factors such as relative
sizes of the country, dierences in costs and the delay with which the process of trade
liberalization is carried out. We consider the analysis carried out here as a step towards
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a better identication of the forces which hurt (or benet) rms under processes of trade
liberalization. We feel this is a necessary step to understand the conditions under which
rms oppose (or favor) such processes.
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